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EUROPE: NilTO's Fourth Decode-
Defense and Detente 
Following are remarks by Vice 
President Mondale and Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs, before 
the 25th assembly of the Atlantic 
Treaty Association on October 10, 
1979, in the Department of State. 
VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE 
I am delighted to have this opportu-
nity and this honor to address this As-
sociation, whose function is so crucial 
and has been so effective since the cre-
ation of this Association those many 
years ago. 
I wish to commend you for the 
superb role that the Atlantic Treaty As-
sociation plays in the support of North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
Today I wish to review the strength and 
constancy of U.S. leadership within 
that treaty organization and emphasize 
how SALT II now pending before the 
U.S. Senate contributes to the safe-
guarding of the alliance. 
As you know, when I speak on be-
half of the American commitment to 
NATO, I speak not only on behalf of 
the President of the United States, Mr. 
Carter, but I think the history of our 
country has shown that consistently 
from the beginning and including 
today, the commitment to NATO by 
our nation is a bipartisan American 
Migratory Animals (Cont' d) 
period of negotiation that would have 
permitted taking home a negotiated and 
preliminary agreed text for study and 
consultation with interested domestic 
groups. It was clear, however, that the 
Federal Republic and the majority of 
the countries present were much in 
favor of concluding and signing a con-
vention at this time. Though the U.S. 
delegation was able to have included in 
the convention a wide range of points, 
the several unresolved issues described 
above, plus the lack of opportunity to 
consult at home, led the U.S. delega-
tion not to sign the convention. At the 
same time, the U.S. delegation recog-
nized the benefits the convention 
should bring to areas of the world 
which have less well developed· con-
servation programs than has North 
America. · 0 
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commitment that is permanent and 
lasting and complete in terms of total 
public support. 
In fact, the first mission of the new 
Administration involved my visit 
within hours of our inaugural-the 
first visit on my international journey 
-to the NATO headquarters in Brus-
sels to underscore immediately the 
commitment of the new Administration 
to the continuation of the strongest 
possible relationship with NATO and 
the strongest possible relationship 
within NATO among its treaty mem-
bers. In 1977 the President sent me to 
Brussels in that first overseas mission 
to underscore that message. 
In the more than 30 years that have 
passed since the North Atlantic Treaty 
was signed, we have shared with our 
allies three unprecedented decades of 
strength, of peace, and of success. 
The 12 nations which signed the 
NATO treaty in 1949 reaffirmed their 
ened obsolescence and the traumas of 
modernization. 
That the alliance has survived and 
flourished through so much challenge 
offers proof that its charter, like our 
own Constitution, is, in fact, a living 
document, broad enough, universal 
enough, and tested enough to serve as a 
basis for the future. But today, as al-
lies, we are not and cannot be compla-
cent. 
If the challenge faced by the alliance 
over the years has changed, it has by 
no means lessened. If the threat to the 
alliance has in some ways become 
more subtle, it is nonetheless formida-
ble. And if the Soviet Union has be-
come more open to cooperation with 
the West than it was in 1949, never-
theless, serious differences and strong 
competition continue to exist between 
East and West. 
I need not describe for this audience 
the long history of the Soviet military 
The President, working with our allies, has increased defense spending 
by 3% a year in real terms . . . . We will continue that growth and will 
request even more if our defense needs require it. 
faith in the purposes and principles of 
the U.N. Charter. They stressed their 
desire to live in peace with all peoples 
and all governments. They have 
pledged to safeguard the principles of 
democracy, individual liberty, and the 
rule of law. And above all, they agreed 
to develop their capacity to resist 
armed attack. An attack against one, 
they agreed, would be considered an 
attack against all. 
It is difficult to realize in our more 
settled and prosperous times, what an 
ambitious, even visionary, act that 
treaty was; how ambitious to speak op-
timistically of peace when the debris of 
World War II had not yet been fully 
cleared away, and how farsighted to 
join in a collective effort to resist ag-
gression when so many of the sig-
natories were individually vulnerable. 
The NATO alliance has shown re-
markable resilience and flexibility. It 
has surmounted recurring problems 
within and challenges without. It has 
undergone strategic and doctrinal 
changes, from an era of massive retali-
ation to an era of flexible response. It 
has endured both the pangs of threat-
buildup of Warsaw Pact forces. That 
history, for many of you, has been a 
daily professional challenge. It is a 
challenge that President Carter has met 
from the beginning of his Administra-
tion with the shaping of U.S. defense 
forces and with his decision to increase 
real defense spending by 3% annually. 
This is not an effort that we bear alone. 
Each of our allies must participate, if 
together we are to benefit. 
The President has submitted to the 
Congress a request, as you know, for 
$2.7 billion amending the FY 1980 
budget so that despite the increased in-
flation which vexes us all, we will 
meet that commitment that we have 
made in all seriousness to NATO. 
Visible strength is a deterrent to war. 
Together with our allies, we have 
begun the process of modernizing our 
defenses for the coming decades to 
meet the massive arms buildup of the 
Soviet Union and the East. 
As you know, just this past week, in 
East Berlin, President Brezhnev an-
nounced unilateral reduction of certain 
Soviet troops, tanks, and other military 




welcome such a reduction, but it is ab-
solutely essential that it be seen in 
context, and that context includes the 
following factors. · 
First, Soviet forces in Europe today 
vastly outnumber those of the NATO 
alliance, and so, as I said, on behalf of 
the President to the U.N. Special Ses-
sion on Disarmament on the eve of the 
1978 NATO summit in Washington, 
we in NATO increased our defense 
budgets, not out of preference but out 
of necessity-a necessity imposed 
upon us, for example, by the Warsaw 
Pact's three to one advantage in tanks 
in Europe. 
Second, the Soviet theater nuclear 
forces have been built up. The Backfire 
bomber and now their new SS-20, an 
intermediate range mobile ballistic 
missile, significantly increases Soviet 
military capability against targets not 
only in Europe but also in Asia, Africa, 
and the Middle East. 
And third, it is obviously in the 
Soviet in.terest to lure NATO away 
from crucial conventional and theater 
nuclear force modernization. 
While we must examine President 
Brezhnev' s announcement carefully 
and affirmatively, we must bear in 
mind that the self-restraint in theater 
nuclear forces shown by the NATO al-
liance over the past two decades has 
not been met by corresponding restraint 
on the part of the Soviets. It is for this 
reason that the work of NATO's groups 
on the theater nuclear forces moderni-
zation and theater nuclear forces arms 
control is so crucially important, as is 
the decision we will take as an alliance 
leader this year on modernized theater 
nuclear forces capable of countering 
real and existing Soviet theater nuclear 
forces opposed against our alliance. 
While deterrence at the theater level 
is of keen concern to each of us, the 
competition between East and West at 
the strategic nuclear level is central to 
our defense and survivaL How we 
manage that competition-literally and 
directly-affects the lives of every 
man, woman, and child through the al-
liance and, indeed, throughout the 
world. 
This week in Washington, as you 
well know, the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee has moved into the 
final phase of its hearings on SALT II. 
As the Senate approaches this historic 
decision, let us look at the record of the 
debate and of the hearings before the 
committees. 
Every single provision of SALT II 
has been scrutinized in detail for days 
of hearings. The agreement has stood 
up to every single criticism leveled 
against it. The treaty is verifiable with-
out any doubt. It is in the alliance's 
interest without any doubt. It strength-
ens our security, and it is a meaningful 
step toward arms reduction., 
SALT II has withstood partisan at-
tack. The fact is that when the Presi-
dent took charge of the strategic arms 
talks, he inherited many provisions of a 
draft agreement negotiated by his pred-
ecessor. We have not only built on that 
draft, we have improved it-broad-
ening the scope of the agreement, 
greatly improving the quantitative and 
qualitative limits, and laying the 
groundwork for the negotiation of fur-
ther limits in our national interests in 
SALT III. 
SALT II has successfully withstood 
determined efforts to link it, to hold it 
hostage to other issues-issues ranging 
from the level of the defense budget to 
the Soviet presence in Cuba, issues im-
portant in their own right but which 
must not be linked to the pending 
SALT treaty. 
I need not detail for the defense ex-
perts in this assembly the positive trend 
in the U.S. defense budget since 1977. 
No linkage to SALT is required for that 
trend to continue. The fact is that the 
President, working with our allies, has 
increased defense spending by 3% a 
year in real terms, reversing several 
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States to pursue strategic programs to 
strengthen our security while also con-
straining the arms race. In the same 
way, SALT provides both a foundation 
for the alliance to build a consensus to 
proceed with essential NATO theater 
nuclear force modernization, and it 
also furthers arms control initiatives to 
control the Soviet threat to Europe. 
Thus, when the Senate votes for 
SALT II-and I have confidence the 
Senate will ratify that treaty- it will 
be voting not only for a strong and 
more stable strategic relationship to-
ward the Soviet Union, it will also be 
giving crucial impetus to a stronger 
NATO and to efforts to reduce the nu-
clear threat facing our allies in the fu-
ture. That is why the members of the 
North Altantic alliance have, without 
exception and with great strength, en-
dorsed SALT II. That is why SALT II 
is so central to continued American 
leadership of this great alliance. 
Earlier this year, soon after the 
signing of the SALT II agreements, I 
visited seven states of our great country 
to discuss SALT with a good cross 
section of the American people. 
Their response was overwhelmingly 
positive. The American people recog-
nize that strategic arms limitation is 
an issue of vital importance for our na-
tion and for mankind. They want any 
The U.S. commitm.ent to the security of Europe is unshakable. It is 
organic. It is complete. We view the security of Western Europe as an 
extension of our own security. 
years of previous decline. We will 
continue that growth and will request 
even more if our defense needs require 
it. 
To deal with the Soviet presence in 
Cuba, we have taken a number of steps 
to neutralize the Soviet role, including 
stepping up U.S. surveillance and 
military presence in the Caribbean. We 
will assure that the Soviets in Cuba 
pose no threat to the United States or 
other nations in this region. · 
When the President announced these 
measures a week ago, he emphasized 
and I quote, that, " ... the greatest 
danger to American security ... is 
certainly not the two or three thousand 
Soviet troops in Cuba. The greatest 
danger to all the nations in the 
world ... is the breakdown of a com-
mon effort to preserve peace and the 
ultimate threat of a nuclear war." 
Finally, SALT II is the central ele-
ment in the alliance's policy of pursu-
ing both defense and detente. SALT II 
provides a framework for the United 
agreement we enter in to be fair, and 
they believe this treaty is fair. They 
want a treaty to protect our security, 
and they understand that this treaty en-
hances America's security. They want 
it ratified, and they want us to continue 
our efforts to reduce the threat of nu-
clear war. 
They understand that SALT does not 
undermine our security. They recog-
nize that SALT is not based on trust but 
on suspicion and that it can be ade-
quately verified. They believe we must 
have SALT II if we're to move to 
SALT III. 
If I have received a single message, 
it is that the American people gen-
uinely believe, as do the President and 
I, that the SALT II agreement is in our. 
interest and that it's vastly superior to 
no agreement at all. 
Every day brings more support for 
the treaty. Just last week I received a 
letter from the President of the Na-
tional Farmers Union representing a 
broad cross section of rural Americans. 
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In it he stated, and I quote: "The full 
board of directors of the Farmers Union 
concurred unanimously that the Nation 
must make headway towards arms 
control. It would be tragic," they con-
tinued, ''if the whole process were to 
be set back by rejection of the present 
treaty. Approval of SALT II at this ses-
sion, therefore, is vitally important so 
that the next steps can begin soon and 
hopefully lead to another advance for 
humanity.'' 
"An advance for humanity." That is 
what the SALT process is all about. 
As you all know, last week America 
welcomed an extraordinary visitor. To 
joyful crowds in cities and farmlands, 
to millions everywhere who saw him 
on television, the Holy Father brought 
a luminous message to mankind and to 
all Americans, a message of love and 
faith and optimism and confidence and 
grace. 
That message struck deep chords 
within us. It unleashed our best and 
most generous sentiments. It opened, 
truly, a window on our soul. It re-
minded us again what our civilization 
is all about-and what this Association 
was established to protect and has 
served so well throughout the history of 
this Association-what it is about is 
the protection and love of our democ-
racy, our drive for social justice, our 
hopes for our children. 
In the end, those are the dreams that 
bond our NATO alliance together. 
That's its basic reason. Nuclear holo-
caust renders those dreams absurd. 
Today, with the decision on SALT II, 
we have a decisive chance to take a fur-
ther step away from that final madness, 
to take a further step toward reason, 
and I'm confident we'll make the right 
choice. 
DR. BRZEZINKSI 
I welcome this opportunity to meet 
with your 25th annual assembly and to 
share with you some informal remarks 
on the subject of Western security on 
the relationship between defense and 
detente. At this time of unprecedented 
global change, our collective security 
requires that the Unites States suc-
cessfully maintain a global power 
equilibrium while helping to shape a 
framework for global change. 
These two imperatives-a power 
equilibrium and a framework for 
change-are not slogans. Each repre-
sents a difficult and vital process, criti-
cal to our security. The maintenance of 
a power equilibrium by itself would be 
insufficient for it would be unrespon-
sive to the imperative need to recognize 
that an awakened global population in-
sists on basic changes in the human 
condition. Shaping a framework for 
global change while disregarding the 
realities of power would contribute to a 
fundamental instability in world affairs; 
it would transform global change from 
a potentially positive process into a 
condition of increasing fragmentation 
and eventual anarchy. 
Since 1945 the United States has 
been the pivotal element in the mainte-
nance of global stability. Initially our 
primary focus was on the defense of 
Western Europe. Today, Western 
Europe, the Far East, and the Middle 
East represent three interrelated stra-
tegic zones of central importance to the 
survival of the West as a whole and to 
global economic stability. This is an 
important strategic reality, and it has 
political, as well as military, implica-
tions. The United States must work 
with the countries in all three zones to 
protect the independence of these 
regions. 
Development of more cooperative 
relationships with a power such as 
China is another important new factor 
in the geopolitical equation, contribut-
ing to greater global stability. 
Insofar as the strategic nuclear 
equilibrium is concerned, the last 30 
years have seen a shift from a U.S. 
monopoly and supremacy to a much 
more complex situation of mutually as-
sured destruction. Moreover, the mo-
mentum of the Soviet nuclear buildup 
does pose the possibility that the Soviet 
Union may be seeking genuine nuclear 
war fighting capability. Accordingly, 
in thinking of the 1980's, we must be 
sensitive to the nuanced psychologi-
cal-political relationship between the 
effective deterrence and war fighting 
capabilities. Therefore, to maintain 
effective deterrence, we must upgrade 
our own capacity to manage a conflict 
stably and to control nuclear escalation 
effectively. 
Our responsiveness to the increasing 
complexity of deterrence is but one 
element in the global power balance. 
Arms control-a new factor in global 
security-is also significant. Such 
steps as SALT I and SALT II, based on 
the recognition that security cannot be 
obtained by arms alone, thus contribute 
to greater stability and predictability in 
the strategic equation. 
The political awakening of mankind 
and resulting redistribution of power 
worldwide is the overriding reality of 
our time. By the end of this century, 
approximately four-fifths of mankind 
will be living in Asia, Latin America, 
and Africa. As a consequence, the 
West can no longer dominate world 
affairs. The only alternative to that 
domination is wider global cooperation 
...... 
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based on the acceptance of basic 
changes. Nothing less than that can in-
sure that global change is not violent, 
~haotic, and increasingly exploited by 
our adversaries. 
i It is, therefore, important that the in-
evitable tensions associated with basic 
sociopolitical change not be exploited 
by major powers either directly or in-
.directly. The export of revolution 
through proxies or by direct military 
power has to be resisted, for otherwise 
global change will become global anar-
chy. These considerations make it im-
perative that self-restraint be the guid-
ing principle for the conduct of the 
major powers in relationship to the 
local conflicts in the more unstable 
parts of the world. 
The key elements of our efforts to 
promote genuine global cooperation, 
designed to create a more equitable 
sharing in global political and eco-
nomic power, accordingly involve: 
• Close cooperation between the 
United States, Western Europe and 
Japan; 
• The development of more friendly 
relationships with some of the emerg-
ing regionally and internationally influ-
ential third world countries, including 
the moderate Arab countries whose in-
fluence is essential in shaping an eco-
nomically and politically moderate 
Middle East; and 
• More emphasis has to be placed on 
multilateral and regional organizations 
such as the United Nations, the Organi-
zation of African Unity, and the As-
sociation of South East Asian Nations. 
:They represent the emerging new 
1 
realities of a more genuinely pluralistic 
;world. · 
1 
As we fashion together the frame-
.work within which many of these 
'changes will be assimilated, NATO's 
role retains vital relevance. The a!-
: liance, a guarantor of basic Western 
security, has special meaning for us in 
the context of global strategic equilib-
rium. Let me say a few words about 
1 
one particularly important aspect of 
that equilibrium. · 
Entering its fourth decade, NATO 
now confronts a challenge and a choice 
as critical as any in its past: The chal-
lenge comes from a resolute, increas-
ingly powerful Soviet Union. The 
choice, however-whether to acquiesce 
to Soviet ascendency or effectively to 
preclude it-lies with us. Let me speak 
about both. 
First the challenge. It is a fact that 
the Soviet Union has been steadily in-
creasing its military expenditures over 
the past 15 or even 20 years. The pro-
jection of Soviet power has gained a 
global capacity; and along with that 
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capacity the Soviet Union continues to 
devote major resources to a regional 
military buildup. In no area is this 
buildup more pronounced than in the 
Soviet forces opposite Western Europe. 
This buildup encompasses all facets of 
Soviet military power-conventional 
forces, long-range and shorter range 
theater nuclear forces, and interconti-
nental forces. 
One part of that buildup-the long-
range theater nuclear forces-is of par-
ticular concern. The SS-20 missile 
represents an enormou·s advance over 
two previous generations of Soviet 
missile weaponry in both quantitative 
and qualitative terms. Compared to the 
older SS-4 and SS-5, the SS-20 is 
three times more accurate than the one 
and six times more accurate than the 
other. And where an earlier generation 
of missiles targeted against NATO 
Europe carried a single warhead, the 
SS-20 carries three. Moreover, the 
mobility of the SS-20, its increased 
range, and the fact that its launcher can 
be quickly reloaded following an initial 
salvo significantly enhance both the 
weapon's destructive force and its 
ability to survive attack. 
In addition to the SS-20 missile, 
the Soviet Union has developed 
a medium-range bomber - the 
Backfire-whose range, greatly ex-
ceeding that of earlier Soviet aircraft, 
enables it to strike directly at Western 
Europe. 
It is clear to us that the Soviets have 
underway a substantial and sustained 
program to modernize, expand, and 
deploy their theater nuclear forces. 
What this means in practical terms can 
be simply yet soberly expressed: At 
current Soviet deployment rates there is 
one new SS-20 warhead deployed 
roughly every second day. 
Such a sustained effort goes well be-
yond what could be explained as 
meeting a reasonable defensive need. 
Yet in the same period of time, NATO 
has done virtually nothing to upgrade 
its own long-range theater nuclear 
forces. 
The· challenge we now confront is 
not only a military one; I believe that 
we have far more to fear from the pos-
sibility of political intimidation. 
Should NATO be viewed as unwilling 
or unable to respond to threats of nu-
clear warfare confined to the European 
area-as the lack of any effective 
theater forces would almost certainly 
make it appear to be-the opportunity 
for Soviet political pressures would be 
correspondingly enlarged. 
That is the challenge. The choice is 
squarely up to us. We can, as an al-
liance, decide to do nothing to offset 
the substantial modernization in Soviet 
theater nuclear forces; we can sit by, 
hoping we can cope with the conse-
quence of inequality; we can allow our-
selves to be lulled into passivity, leav-
ing the alliance in a situation of in-
equality and growing vulnerability; or 
we can take effective action now. This 
means, in turn, the deployment of 
strong, theater-based systems capable 
of reaching Soviet territory. 
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Such a decision to deploy NATO 
systems would not only keep the cred-
ibility of our deterrent intact but would 
help promote the conditions under 
which meaningful arms control negoti-
ations between East and West can pro-
ceed. In line with our twin goals of 
deterrence and detente, alliance delib-
erations over the past year have, in 
fact, actively explored meaningful 
lJ.S. Commitment 
to Western Europe 
SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 10, 19791 
The security of Western Europe and 
the security of the United States are in-
divisible. This central fact has been the 
basis of our strategic doctrine and our 
defense planning for four decades or 
more. Our allies believe, as do we, that 
our mutual security requires collective 
effort and that our defense is insepara-
ble. There should be no question about 
America's commitment to help defend 
Europe with all the means necessary-
nuclear and conventional. The sub-
stantial forces we have deployed to 
Europe are not concrete evidence of 
that commitment. 
As President Carter said in his proc-
lamation on the 30th anniversary of the 
alliance, " ... the firm support of 
Congress and the American people for 
NATO reflects their deep conviction 
that NATO is the cornerstone of United 
States foreign policy.'' 
NATO's basic strategy is one of 
flexible response. President Carter has, 
on several occasions, expressed U.S. 
support for this strategy. There has 
been no change, and we contemplate 
no change. 
The defense efforts now underway 
within NATO demonstrate the collec-
tive determination of the allies to meet 
new challenges. To improve NATO's 
conventional forces and to make more 
efficient use of combined resources, 
the alliance is proceeding with a 
Long-Term Defense Program. We are 
cooperating in plans to modernize our 
theater nuclear forces. And we are de-
veloping an agreed alliance position 
regarding future arms control negotia-
tions. 
At the same time, the United States 
is engaged in a thorough and vigorous 
program to modernize each leg of our 
strategic forces. Our determination to 
maintain the strategic balance is re-
fleeted most recently in the President's 
announcement last week that we will 
proceed with full development of the 
new MX missile in a mobile basing 
mode that, while fully verifiable under 
SALT, will assure the long-term sur-
vivability of our land-based strategic 
forces. 
Our strategic modernization programs 
reflect our determination not only to 
maintain the strategic balance but also 
to hold a capacity for flexible 
response-in terms of size and targets 
of the response-to any attack at any 
level of intensity, against us or our al-
lies. That has been U.S. policy for 
many years. It continues to be U.S. 
policy. And we will maintain the forces 
necessary to fulfill it. 
This modernization of nuclear and 
conventional forces is being undertaken 
precisely because the allies seek to 
deter aggression by maintaining the 
integrity and credibility of the whole 
spectrum of our response options. To 
deter aggression, NATO must both 
have-and be perceived to have-the 
capability, flexibility, and determina-
tion to respond as appropriate. Only in 
this way can we demonstrate to the 
Warsaw Pact the costs of embarking 
upon or continuing a conflict and the 
risk that a conventional European re-
gional conflict would escalate to a gen-
eral nuclear war. 
The security of the alliance depends 
not only on collective military forces 
and resolve-although these are indis-
pensable- it depends as well on com-
mon ties among allied peoples and their 
creativity and vitality in meeting the 
challenges we confront together. We 
are confident of the alliance's con-
tinued ability to do so. D 
1 Made available to the press by Department 
spokesman Hodding Carter III. 
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Review of 
lJ.S. Policy in Europe 
by George S. Vest 
Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
July 12, 1979. 1 
I welcome this opportunity to discuss 
with you the state of U.S. relations in 
Europe. I know that your overriding 
concern is U.S. policy. What are our 
main objectives? What have we 
achieved? What remains to be done? 
It is with an eye to those central is-
sues that this annual review is ad-
dressed. The succinct answer to your 
questions is that U.S.-European rela-
tiOns are in good shape. 
• We have reaffirmed and reinforced 
our commitment to the traditional prin-
ciples of U.S. policy and to our trans-
atlantic partners. 
• We continue to stress items of 
highest priority for the U.S. national 
interest-Western solidarity, the mili-
tary defense of the West, economic 
well-being, the preservation and de-
Defense and Detente (Cont' d) 
arms control policy along with the need 
to modernize nuclear-capable systems. 
It is no secret that we view both 
paths-effective arms control and 
modernization-as complementary and 
that we look for credible movement 
along both by the end of this year. The 
true test of NATO's purpose lies with 
our allied parliaments and publics. Are 
they willing to pay the political price 
required to avoid the infinitely more 
costly alternative of intimidation at 
best, and even war at worst? 
Let there be no question about our 
commitment nor of our determination 
to help defend Europe by all means 
necessary-nuclear and conventional. 
The U.S. commitment to the security 
of Europe is unshakable. It is organic. 
It is complete. We view the security of 
Western Europe as an extension of our 
own security. We recognize that. any 
threat to the security of Western 
Europe is a direct threat to the security 
of the United States. The American 
commitment-nuclear and conven-
tional-to the defense of Europe is an 
integral part of our own defense pos-
ture. There are no conceivable circum-
stances in which we would not react to 
a security threat directed at our allies in 
Europe. 
velopment of democratic institutions in 
Western Europe, and the promotion of 
constructive relations with the diverse 
countries of Eastern Europe. 
· • We are working together with the 
governments of Western Europe and 
Canada on major issues of mutual con-
cern. They have, for example, ex-
pressed strong support for SALT II, 
and they recognize the continuing need 
to cooperate on the economic chal-
lenges before us all. 
To elaborate on these larger themes 
that pervade recent and current U.S. 
policy toward Europe, I will start with 
a discussion of our role vis-a-vis the 
major institutions of Europe. I will 
then move to discussion of our bilateral 
ties with the Western European and 
nonaligned nations and Canada. I will 
conclude with a summary of the evolu-
tion of our relations in Eastern Europe. 
Western Military Security 
Concern for the security of our citi-
zens remains fundamental to U.S. 
foreign policy. In that regard, the 
The danger we could face in the 
1980's will not be American decou-
pling from Western Europe; rather, the 
danger will derive from Soviet miscal-
culation-that is, from the belief that 
the alliance, through failure to keep 
pace with a changing strategic envi-
ronment, has decoupled from its tradi-
tional purpose. 
We must remove any possible 
grounds for that miscalculation. It is 
my belief that the decision which 
President Carter made a few weeks ago 
on the MX missile and the decisions 
which NATO must soon make on 
theater nuclear forces are as important 
as any the Western allies will ever 
face. Historically, those decisions rank 
with President Truman's creation of a 
strategic bomber command and Presi-
dent Kennedy's deployment of inter-
continental ballistic missiles. Positive 
action now will give us survivable 
systems on both sides of the Atlantic. 
These, in turn, will greatly enhance the 
West's crisis-bargaining capability and 
thus contribute to global stability. 
·We are approaching a watershed in 
our alliance. The issue confronting us 
is fundamentally a simple one: We do 
not have to choose between detente and 
defense; we must have both, and-with 
political will-we can. 0 
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American role in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) is central. 
This year we celebrated the ·30th an-
niversary of an alliance which, ac-
cording to President Carter, has '' . . ·, 
successfully deterred war and main-
tained stability in Western Europe and 
North America, thus securing the 
well-being· and prosperity of its fifteen 
member states . . . . '' · 
NATO's 'main purpose is, in the 
words of the North Atlantic Treaty, 
" ... To safeguard the freedom, com-
mon heritag'e and civilization of their 
peoples, founded on the principles of 
democracy, • individual liberty and the 
I 
rule of law,'' and ''. . . to promote 
stability and well-being in the North 
Atlantic area." NATO's basic means 
to achieve these goals are to deter war 
in the North Atlantic community and to 
defend its member states, if deterrence 
fails, by sustaining the credibility of 
NATO's strategy of forward defense 
and flexible response based on a triad 
of conventional, tactical nuclear, and 
strategic nuclear forces. 
U.S. policies to carry out this strat-
egy center, in the first instance, on the 
modernization of theater nuclear and 
conventional forces. These improve-
ments are required in order to maintain 
the credibility of NATO strategy in the 
face of Soviet theater nuclear and con-
ventional fo.rce improvements over the 
past decade.' · 
U.S. policies toward NATO, in the 
second instance, aim at restraining 
arms competition in strategic, theater 
nuclear, and conventional armaments. 
We carried out continuous consulta-
tions with our NATO partners on the 
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks 
(SALT), and we coordinate closely 
with them on mutual and balanced 
force reductions (MBFR) and other 
arms control initiatives. 
Thus, U.S. policy toward NATO 
offers the Soviet Union and its allies an 
alternative to an unrelenting force 
buildup, while NATO force improve-
ments offer them an incentive to move 
forward on this option: . 
Equally important, the United States 
pursues these policies in NATO in :a 
way that preserves political cohesion 
among members of the alliance: It is in 
the interest of NATO solidarity that we 
consult continuously with our allies not 
only on the issues of arms control. but 
also on global issues where the national 
interests of the United States and its 
allies intersect. 
The impact of U.S. policy on this in-
stitutional cornerstone of Western se-
curity is impressive. We held a 
ministerial meeting recently at which 
there was a most useful exchange of 
views. We are confident that our effort 
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to help shore up NATO's defenses, re-
newed after long concentration on 
Southeast Asia, is making headway. 
• On conventional forces, the NATO 
summit a year ago approved the 
Long-Term Defense Program. It pro-
vides programmatic remedies for such 
deficiencies in conventional forces as 
antiarmor, reenforcement, reserve 
mobilization, maritime, air defense 
and logistics. Complementing the pro~ 
gram was the NATO summit's com-
mitment to the goal of 3% real annual 
increases in members' defense spend-
ing. Needed improvements could not 
have been made on the basis of existing 
levels of defense expenditure. The 
summit also approved alliance cooper-
ation in the development and production 
of armaments in order to bring about 
g~~ater standardization and interopera-
bihty of NATO arms and greater effi-
ciency in the employment of economic 
resources. 
• On theater nuclear forces the 
Long-Term Defense Program gives im-
petus to consultations with allies on the 
need to modernize. The question has 
taken on particular importance in view 
of the continuing deployment of Soviet 
long-range theater nuclear systems 
targeted on Western Europe, such as 
the SS-20 missile and the Backfire 
bomber. These consultations, carried 
on in the NATO Nuclear Planning 
Group's high level group (which we 
chair), are moving toward recommen-
dations for theater nuclear force mod-
ernization. In parallel with this proc-
ess, we are consulting with our allies 
on theater nuclear arms control meas-
ures in the special group, which the 
United States also chairs. 
• On strategic arms limitations, we 
have consulted closely with our Euro-
pean allies and Canada over the course 
of the recent years to insure that the 
SALT II treaty protects and enhances 
their security. The consultations have 
focused on treaty issues of particular 
interest to the allies, such as the pro-
tocol cruise missile restrictions and the 
noncircumvention provision. European 
leaders made clear their support for 
SALT II at the Guadeloupe summit last 
January, in individual governmental 
statements in the intervening months 
and, most recently, at the NATO 
Foreign and Defense Ministers' meet-
ings in May and after the NATO Coun-
cil reviewed the treaty on June 29. 
I could not give a comprehensive re-
view of our NATO policies without 
touching on the question of enhanced 
radiation warheads, the so-called 
neutron bomb. This defensive tactical 
nuclear weapon was designed to 
counter an enemy tank assault with a 
nuclear warhead which would cause 
less collateral damage than existing nu-
clear weapons. The President decided 
in April 1978 to defer production of the 
weapon but to modernize tactical nu-
clear forces in such a way as to leave 
open the option of adding it at some 
future time, depending on Soviet re-
straint. 
In addition to the defense side of our 
policy toward NATO, we have, on the 
political side, sustained the vital con-
sultative process on issues of mutual 
concern. East-West relations the 
Mideast, China, Southeast Asia' and 
Africa have been prominent amo~g the 
questions of foreign policy we have 
addressed in the NATO Council, often 
with special experts sent from Wash-
ington for the meetings. 
The need to preserve political cohe-
sion in NATO, while a truism, can 
never be taken for granted, precisely 
because we are an alliance of 15 
sovereign equals. And, the greatest 
single burden in this respect falls on 
the United States. It is, in part, for that 
reason that President Carter has met 
three times with the North Atlantic 
<;ouncil. Our leadership is an impera-
tive. Further, the manner in which we 
lead influences NATO's cohesiveness 
as well as its effectiveness. 
The fact that NATO's basic fabric is 
strong and resilient in 1979 is a signal 
achievement. It may be a greater ac-
complishment now than it was in 1959 
or 1969 when we were in the midst of, 
or were just emerging from, the cold 
war. To have preserved the commit-
ment of NATO's 15 members to the 
alliance has been a difficult challenge 
in an increasingly multipolar world 
where defense and detente have been 
our declared policy since 1967. And, it 
has been all the more difficult for 
NATO to confront collectively the un-
precedented, broad range of divisive 
issues that face the West today. 
Finally, the very success of our ef-
forts to preserve Western security be-
gets new challenges. On the defense 
side, our success in achieving alliance 
agreement on how to respond to the 
Warsaw Pact conventional and theater 
nuclear challenge leaves the need to 
follow through with implementation of 
agreed decisions. 
• On the Long-Range Defense Pro-
gram, the United States must lead the 
effort for vigorous followthrough on 
the 123 conventional force improve-
ment measures approved at the NATO 
summit a year ago. 
• On improved cooperation in 
NATO armaments, U.S. leadership 
will require imagination and face hard 
choices, given the economic as well as 
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military implications of this issue. The 
executive branch intends to work 
closely with the Congress and with 
U.S. business and industry. 
• Similarly, carrying out the goal of 
a 3% increase in defense expenditures 
will necessitate equally tough choices. 
If we fail to fulfill our commitments, 
our allies are likely to find it impos-
sible to convince their own publics and 
parliaments of this need. 
• On theater nuclear force moderni-
zation, we will continue to consult 
closely with allies, looking to NATO 
decisions near the end of the year. 
• Close consultations will be the 
order of the day for SALT III. · 
• On the political side, the current 
effectiveness of our intensive consulta-
tions in NATO does not relieve us of 
the task of maintaining that process. It 
is a primary necessity for NATO, as 
well as for our own foreign and secu-
rity policies. And, needless to say, we 
in the executive branch attach compa-
rable importance to the need to continue 
to consult with the Congress as we 
move ahead on issues vital to U.S. se-
curity. 
Western Economic Well-Being 
There can be no enduring military 
security without a sound basis in eco-
nomic strength. Recession can imperil 
the defensive underpinnings of the al-
liance and the political stability of its 
member states. Concern about eco-
nomic issues in general and energy in 
particular ranks uppermost in the minds 
of Europeans, as much as with most 
Americans. 
How to deal with shared economic 
problems is thus a major consideration 
in U.S.-European relations. Because 
the problems are so great and because 
the need for cooperation is so clear, we 
have put primary emphasis on working 
together. Recognition of the necessity 
for close consultation on shared chal-
lenges to our economic well-being is 
the basis for holding economic summits 
and it accounts for the special emphasis 
we place on working with two major 
multilateral institutions-the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the Euro-
pean Community (EC). 
We have made a concerted and con-
tinuing effort to underscore the role of 
the OECD as a major forum for coop-
eration among the industrialized na-
tions. At the June 13-14 OECD 
ministerial meeting, Deputy Secretary 
of State Warren Christopher, Secretary 
of the Treasury Michael Blumenthal, 
and Council of Economic Advisers 
Chairman Charles Schultze headed the 
U.S. delegation. They focused on the 
38 
need to grapple collectively with such 
problems as sustained noninflationary 
economic growth, payments imbal-
ances and the international monetary 
situation, energy, the North-South 
dialogue, and structural change brought 
about by changes in technology and 
relative prices, as well as shifting pat-
terns of world production and trade. 
Using the OECD as the principal 
forum, we have engaged in extensive 
consultations with the EC nine and 
other European countries on North-
South issues. We have been successful 
in building support for U.S. views and 
in achieving a common position among 
the OECD member countries in meet-
ings such as the recently concluded 
UNCT AD V [U.N. Conference on 
Trade and Development] session in 
Manila. This time, the industrialized 
countries had a cohesive approach, and 
we avoided acrimonious disputes with 
our allies. 
The International Energy Agency 
(lEA), an independent agency within 
the OECD framework, is the principal 
forum for consumer country coopera-
tion on energy matters. As recent price 
and supply developments illustrate, 
there is a need to maintain a united 
consumer country position and for 
careful management of the situation. 
The lEA ministerial meeting, May 
21-22, reconfirmed the decision for 
members to adopt measures to reduce 
their collective demand for oil by 2 
million barrels per day, or by about 5% 
of anticipated 1979 lEA demand. The 
ministers decided to continue such ef-
forts in 1980 and agreed on a set of 
policies and principles for enhancing 
coal utilization, production, and trade. 
France, although not an lEA member, 
has adopted parallel conservation 
measures. The EC is an lEA participant 
and the EC energy program has re-
flected lEA recommendations. The 
Tokyo summit commitments to limit oil 
imports are based upon the lEA pro-
gram. 
A substantial package of economic 
assistance for Turkey has been de-
veloped within the OECD framework, 
with the Federal Republic of Germany 
and OECD Secretary General Van 
Lennep playing key lead roles. A 
pledging session in Paris, May 30, re-
sulted in commitments in excess of 
$900 million over the next year in the 
form of concessional credits, export 
credits, and grants. The U.S. share is 
approximately $250 million, subject to 
congressional authorization and appro-
priation. The pledging of these funds 
has facilitated the completion of an 
agreement betweeri the Turkish Gov-
ernment and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) on appropriate economic 
policies. We expect to receive formal 
IMF approval later this month. 
U.S. support for the process of 
European integration, exemplified by 
the evolution of the European Commu-
nity, remains strong. We consider 
progress toward European unity of 
primary importance for Europe, for the 
West, and for the world. At the same 
time, we believe that European unity 
must be achieved by the Europeans 
themselves. It is in that spirit that we 
follow with interest such milestones in 
the move toward European unity as the 
establishment of the European mone-
tary system, the enlargement of the 
Community to include nations of 
southern Europe, and the holding of 
direct elections to the European Parlia-
ment. We view these developments 
and others as reflections of the growing 
habit of Europeans to think and act in 
the European context. 
• We welcome the European mone-
tary system; launched on March 13, 
1979, by all EC members except the 
United Kingdom. It is an effort to 
stabilize intra-EC exchange rates and to 
provide additional resources to counter 
exchange speculation. It is a major 
Franco-German political initiative, de-
signed to stabilize European currencies 
and, incidentally, to foster European 
ecomonic integration. Its long-term 
success will depend on the member 
states' ability to harmonize their eco-
nomic policies. 
• We applaud the signing of a treaty 
of accession for Greece on May 28, 
1979. After ratification by all the na-
tional parliaments, Greece is expected 
to become the 1Oth EC member on 
January 1, 1981. Portugal and Spain 
have also applied for membership and 
substantive negotiations are expected to 
begin this fall, with entry into the EC 
as early as 1982-83. The primary 
motivation for EC enlargement is 
political: to bind the newly democratic 
applicants to the more advanced Euro-
pean democracies and thereby enhance 
their political and economic stability. 
• We consider the first elections to 
the European Parliament, June 7-10, a 
significant step forward for Europe. 
The shift to direct elections will not in-
crease the limited advisory and over-
sight powers of the Parliament, but the 
new legislators will adopt a higher 
profile than their appointed predeces-
sors and will gradually seek to expand 
their influence. We hope that, in due 
course, the present ties between the 
Congress and the European Parliament 
can be strengthened to reflect the sig-
nificance of the June elections. 
In addition to expanding U.S. activ-
ity in the OECD and increasing cooper-
ation with the EC, there are other de-
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velopments in the economic realm that 
merit mention. We continue to partici-
pate in economic ·summits as one of 
several means to buttress joint action 
for economic well-being. The eco-
nomic summit in Tokyo was a crucial 
opportunity to focus on such priority 
issues as energy. 
In the area of energy, the most im-
portant decisions revolved around the 
commitment to set national ceilings for 
oil imports for 1980 and 1985 and to 
insure. adequate resources for the de-
velopment and commercial application 
of technologies for alternative sources 
of energy. Both the OECD, including 
the lEA, and the European Community 
will play a significant role in the fol-
lowup to the commitments made by the 
summit participants. 
Although energy was the key issue 
discussed at the Tokyo summit, the 
participants also made commitments to 
do more to improve the long-term pro-
ductive efficiency and flexibility of 
their economies, to implement the 
agreements re'ached in the Tokyo 
Round of the multilateral trade negoti-
ations (MTN), to achieve durable ex-
ternal equilibrium, and to pursue con-
structive North-South relations. 
After years of arduous bargaining, 
we have achieved the successful con-
clusion of the MTN. U.S.-EC negotia-
tions lay at the heart of the MTN be-
cause of the Community's weight in 
world trade. We have, in consultation 
with the Congress, prepared the neces-
sary U.S. implementing legislation. 
We will be consulting closely with the 
EC and other European countries to in-
sure that their implementing regula-
tions and legislative procedures are a 
comprehensive and accurate reflection 
of the agreements reached at Geneva. 
With ratification, we will have to put 
the new rules' into practice through re-
vised GATT: [General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade] procedures and thus 
be able to deal with trade disputes over 
the coming decades. 
Over the past year, we have been 
working closely with our European al-
lies to arrive at reasonable solutions 
which balance proliferation concerns 
with energy needs. The International 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation 
(INFCE) is part of this process. In ad-
dition, as required by the 1978 Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Act, we are negoti-
ating a new nuclear cooperation agree-
ment with the EC and hope to conclude 
a new agreement sometime next year 
after the end of INFCE. We are also 
working with the EC and the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
in Vienna to accelerate the conclusion 
of facility inspection arrangements 
between the EC and the IAEA. 
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Bilateral Relations 
. Aithough the United States places 
signifiCant emphasis ori using multilat~ 
eral institutions to help foster Western 
military security and economic well-
being, we must, at the same time, deal 
with our European counterparts and 
nonaligned nations effectively· on a 
bilateral basis. Here-as with NATO, 
the OECD, and the EC-.we are 
searching together for solutions to 
problems that affect both Europeans 
and Americans. . 
. · We have deepened mutual under~ 
standing on bilateral policy issues with 
the Federal Republic of Germany 
through intensified consultations. Of 
particular note during the last year 
were the President's highly successful 
state visit to the F.R.G. in July 1978 
and Chancellor Schmidt's visit to 
Washington last month. The Chancel-
lor has countered reports of a deterio-
ration in U.S.-F. R. G. relations in 
major speeches in Germany and during 
his June 1979 visit in the United States. 
In a speech at the University of South 
Carolina, for example, he emphasized 
that firm U.S.-German ties are a reli-
able feature in today's international 
affairs and that "the focus of our rela-
tions is no longer on a purely bilateral 
relationship but on the wider tasks and 
responsibilities which we share." 
He has expressed strong support for 
the President's efforts to achieve last-
ing peace in the Middle East and for 
the prompt conclusion and ratification 
of SALT II. Areas of U.S.-West Ger-
man relations requiring continued spe-
cial attention include military-security 
policy, East-West relations, the coor-
dination of economic measures, and 
policies on nuclear energy and export. 
We continue to have a positive re-
lationship with France based on 
mutual respect and exemplified by the 
recent Washington visit by French 
Foreign Minister Francois-Poncet and 
effective consultations with the French 
during their term in the EC presidency 
this year. We recognize that, in its role 
as a major power, France has its own 
views on such questions as peace in the 
Middle East, organizing assistance for 
Africa, conventional disarmament in 
Europe, oil price ceilings, and export 
credit competition. All of these ques-
tions are under extensive discussion, as 
are such questions as nuclear non-
proliferation where there is now a 
greater identity of view. The impor-
tant underlying factor in all these ques-
tions is that French and U.S. basic ob-
jectives in the world are similar, while 
we sometimes seek their achievement 
along different but parallel paths. 
Since I talked with your committee 
last year, the Conservative Party in 
Great Britian has returned to power. 
Prime Minister Thatcher's victory, 
May 3, has given her party a solid 
working majority in Parliament and a 
strong mandate to. try a Tory approach 
to dominant domestic economic issues. 
We expect our close ties with Britain to 
continue, as we work together on 
problems of mutual interest, especially 
those regarding Western security and 
southern Africa. If differences of view 
on some specific issues should emerge 
between us and the new British Gov-
ernment, we are confident that they 
will be resolved through the close and 
continuing cooperation that has long 
existed between our two countries. The 
Administration's dealings with the new 
British Government got off to an ex-
cellent start when Secretary Vance vis-
ited London, May 20-24. The Presi-
dent and Mrs. Thatcher met in Tokyo 
for the economic summit last month. 
We remain distressed by the con-
tinuing violence in Northern Ireland 
which, although below the level of 
several years ago, still claims lives 
with tragic regularity and disrupts so-
cial peace and economic progress. As 
President Carter has said, our policy on 
Northern Ireland is one of impartiality, 
. 39 
and we recognize that the only. perma-
nent solution must come from the 
people who live there. Given a settle-
ment. acceptable to both· parts of the 
community, we would be prepared to 
join with others to see how job-creating 
investment could be encouraged for the 
benefit of all in Northern Ireland. 
We, of course, continue. to enjoy 
close ties with the Republic of Ireland 
and are pleased to witness its continu-
ing economic growth. We welcome 
Ireland's increased activity on the 
world scene, as evidenced by its con-
tribution of troops to U.N~ peacekeep-
ing efforts in Lebanon and its assump-
tion of the presidency of the European 
Economic Community for the second 
half of this year. We look forward to 
the visit of Prime Minister Lynch this 
November. That occasion will give us 
the opportunity to consult with him in 
his dual capacity as head of govern-
ment and president of the Council of 
Ministers of the European Community. 
We have continued our traditionally 
close ties with the nations of the Nordic 
area, an area of growing strategic sig-
nificance in the light of the steady 
build-up of Soviet forces on the nearby 
Kola Peninsula. Vice President Mon-
Fourth flnniversory 
of the Helsinki Final flet 
. . . 
PRESIDENT'S ·sTATEMENT, 
AUG. 1, 1979 1 
On this day in 197 5, the leaders of 
35 states met in Helsinki to sign the 
Final Act of the Conference on Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE): They pledged to build a future 
of peace and stability in Europe on the 
strong foundation of mutual under-
standing and respect for fundamental 
human rights. · 
In the years since Helsinki, we have 
witnessed conscientious efforts on the 
part of many signatory states to fulfill, 
fully and completely, their obligations 
under the Final Act. We have made 
progress in insuring the freer flow of 
people and ideas. Flagrant abuses ·of 
human rights no longer go unnoticed 
and unchallenged. . 
The Final Act provision which calls 
for notification of large military maneu-
vers has worked well. The spirit ·.of 
Helsinki is alive. But there have· also 
been important setbacks. For example, 
in the German Democratic Republic, 
harsh new laws designed to restrict 
contact with foreigners will take effect 
today, on the anniversary of Helsinki. 
In Czechoslovakia, members of the 
Charter '77 movement remain in 
prison, facing trial for their dedication 
to basic human freedoms. In the Soviet 
Union, organizations established to 
monitor compliance with the Helsinki 
agreement have been harassed and their 
members jailed. Acts like these are to-
tally inconsistent with pledges inade at 
Helsinki. · .. 
On the anniversary· of the Helsinki 
accords, I rededicate this Administra-
tion and this nation to strive tirelessly 
for full implementation of the Final 
Act. We will continue to .review our 
own record in. preparation. for the 
meeting of CSCE states at Madrid in 
1980. And we call upon o"ther. signatory 
states to work with us so that we may 
mutually fulfill the obligations tinde.r-
taken at Helsinki to peace, security, 
. and human rights. 0 
1 Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of Aug. 6; 1979." · 
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dale's trip to northern Europe in April 
1979 demonstrated the solidarity of our 
NATO links to Iceland, Norway, and 
Denmark. On the same journey, he vis-
ited Sweden and Finland as visible 
evidence of our respect for these na-
tions and their policy of neutrality, 
which also contributes to the stability 
of the northern region. The Vice Presi-
dent's trip to northern Europe was the 
first undertaken of that scope and at 
that level since Lyndon Johnson visited 
the area as Vice President in 1963. 
Although the Nordic countries have 
differing security policies, they share 
common concerns with each other and 
with the United States on such global 
issues as human rights, East-West re-
lations, arms control, U.N. peace-
keeping, the Middle East, and eco-
nomic development of the Third 
World. Vice President Mondale's trip 
provided an opportunity for high-level 
consultation on these world issues 
where the Nordic countries play a 
leading role and where their advice and 
support are important to us .. The visit 
last month to Washington of Norwe-
gian Prime Minister Nordli was a wel-
come reaffirmation of this process. 
Both in our talks and in public· state-
ments, Nordli stressed Norway's 
''close commitment'' to NATO and 
emphasized that "SALT is' an impor-
tant element in the evolution of the 
East-West detente." · · 
Our relations with the Benelux 
countries continue to be ex·cellent and 
largely free of bilateral problems. We 
welcome their contributions to NATO 
defense and to peaceful solutions to 
common problems, both political and 
economic. Examples of these include 
the Belgian contribution to stability in 
Zaire and the Dutch contribution of 
troops for the U.N. forces in Lebanon. 
The Vice President's visit to the 
Netherlands in April underlined the 
importance we attach to that country 
and the rest of the Benelux. 
U.S. policy goals in Spain remain to 
support Spanish democracy and 
Spanish integration with the rest of 
Western Europe and to maintain our 
mutually beneficial security relation-
ship. Our cooperation under the 1976 
treaty of friendship and cooperation 
contributes to the security of both na-
tions and makes an important contribu-
tion to the defense of Western Europe 
and the Mediterranean. 
Spain has made tremendous progress 
in its transition to democracy in the 
face of serious political and economic 
difficulties. Having adopted a new 
democratic constitution and carried out 
both national and local elections since 
December, the country is about to enter 
a challenging post-transition phase of 
political life in which fundamental 
issues-such as economic policy, basic 
implementing legislation, and regional 
autonomy-must be addressed. Of par-
ticular seriousness is the problem of the 
continued, brutal terrorist campaign to 
destabilize Spanish democracy. 
Our support for Spain, as manifested 
by the Administration and the Con-
gress, and by our close relationship, 
assists the Spanish people in their ef-
forts to realize the democratic ideals 
we share. Secretary [of Defense] 
Browri visited Madrid in mid-May. On 
June 1, Secretary' Vance cochaired a 
meeting of the U.S.-Spanish Council in 
Madrid and met with the King and the 
Prime Minister. ·. · 
U.S. relations with Portugal con-
tinue to be excellent. Our governp1ents' 
shared goals of democratic consolida-
tion and professionalization of the 
military were recently highlighted and 
reinforced during visits to Portugal by 
Secretary Brown and Senator· Edmund 
Muskie and a meeting .between ~ecre­
tary Vance and the ~ortuguese Foreign 
Minist.er at The Hague. Secretary 
Vance stopped .inLisbon, June 18-19 
to sign the extension of the Azores base 
agreement.· · . · '· · · ·: · 
· With the May 30 passage .of the 
budget, Portugal can also look forward 
to resuming negotiations with the IMF 
on· a third credit ·tranche· standby.' The 
fourth constitutional government 
headed py Prime Minister Mota Pinto 
submitted its resignation on June 6 but 
will remain in caretaker status until a 
government is formed or' electim1s are 
held. The debate over the formation of 
any future' government is, however, 
distinguished by the .continued firm 
commitment to the democratic process 
and by a common willingness to seek a 
reasonable compromise to solve pres-
ent problems. . · · 1 
Our important interests in Italy re-
main what they have been· since the 
war. Italy's strategic position in south-
ern Europe and the Mediterranean, its 
willingness to host American military 
bases dedicated to NATO, its nearly 
total support for American foreign 
policy positions, and its status as a 
major U.S. trading partner underscore 
the value of good U.S.-Italian rela-
tions. · · 
Over the past year and a half, we 
have tried to reinforce our close re-
lationship with Italy by pur·suing a 
"strategy of cooperation" comprising 
concrete, mutually beneficial projects 
in such diverse fields as energy, health, 
and. the environment. The program 
stresses medium- to long-range efforts 
to assist the Italians to 'solve their seri-
ous problems, to solidify our relations 
for the future, and to take advantage of 
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Italian expertise in areas where they are 
advanced, like solar energy. We have 
also encouraged high-level visits be-
tween our two countries! the latest 
being that of Secretary Varice less than 
6 weeks ago. i 
Elsewhere in the eastern Mediterra-
nean, the United States continues to 
work for stability in the area, including 
good relations with Greece'and Turkey, 
progress toward a Cyprus solution, and 
the general strengthening of democracy 
among the countries of the region. 
During the past year, there have been 
significant developments in all of these 
areas. ! 
With regard to Cyprus;· the Admin-
istration has been actively engaged 
over the past year in seeking to pro-
mote an early and effective resumption 
of intercommunal negotiations. The 
centerpiece of this effort was the series 
of substantive suggestions that we 
submitted to the two Cypriot parties 
last November 10, in conjunction with 
the British and Canadian Government.s. 
We are gratified that our efforts and the 
initiative undertaken by U.N. Secretary 
General Waldheim resulted in an 
agreement to resume intercommunal 
nego_tiations Jurie 15. Unfortunately, 
these talks have run into temporary 
difficulties over the agenda and have 
now been recessed. ! 
We hope, however, that these dif-
ficulties will be overcome soon and 
that we will see sustained and produc-
tive negotiations leading to concrete 
progress toward a mutually acceptable 
settlement. As in past months, we will 
work closely with the United Nations, 
the Cypriot parties, and our allies to 
help insure the success of these talks. 
· Turkey_ continues to be plagued by 
serious economic problems. We have 
worked to help solve them by propos-
ing a substantial U.S. assistance pro-
gram, as well as by working with other 
countries in a multilateral effort led by 
the Federal Republic of Germany to 
prov.ide Turkey with needed foreign 
exchange so that necessary steps can be 
taken by the Turkish Government to 
start on the road to economic recovery 0 
As I noted earlier, the 'multilateral ef-
fort is proceeding welL/ . 
Our security relationship with Tur-
key has also improved. In response to 
the lifting of the arms embargo, the 
Turkish Government, on October 9, 
1978. authorized the resumption of 
U.S. military activities in Turkey. The 
authorization was for a 1-year period 
during which a permanent arrangement 
for tjle operations of the activities is to 
be negotiated. Formill negotiations 
began on January 18 ,' 1979, and are 
continuing. They involve several com-
plex issues and much work remains to 
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be done, but we are confident that we 
will work out a mutually satisfactory 
agreement. 
Discussions are continuing within 
NATO to develop arrangements for the 
reintegration of Greek forces into the 
alliance's integrated military structure. 
As you know, Greece withdrew its 
forces in 1974 at the time of the Cyprus 
events. In the interim, there have been 
command changes on the southern 
flank which make necessary new com-
mand and control arrangements in the 
sensitive Aegean area. The issue has 
been handled in NATO military chan-
nels with Gen. [Alexander] Haig play-
ing a key role in his capacity as Su-
preme Allied Commander Europe. The 
retirement of Gen. Haig will not halt 
the process. As we have stated re-
peatedly, we believe it is important to 
secure the return of Greek forces at the 
earliest possible time. 
Greece, in the meantime, is enjoying 
a continuing period of ecomonic vital-
ity and democratic strength, as demon-
strated by it signing a treaty of acces-
sion to the European Communities. 
That development contributes to one of 
our major policy goals-stability in the 
vital eastern Mediterranean area. 
U.S. relations with Canada are ex-
cellent. We enjoyed close working re-
lations with the Trudeau government 
and look forward to continuing close 
cooperation with Prime Minister Joe 
Clark. We particularly value the co-
operative approaches to the energy 
challenge which we have effected with 
the Canadians, as well as cooperation 
on such global concerns as the Cyprus 
dispute, southern Africa, the Mideast 
peace effort, and assistance for In-
dochinese refugees. 
We are gratified by Prime Minister 
Clark's reaffirmation of Canada's 
commitment to NATO and the North 
American Air Defense Command 
(NORAD) and his indication that 
Canada should increase defense 
spending. Finally, we hope that 
longstanding differences on fisheries 
and boundary issues in the Gulf of 
Maine will be resolved by two treaties 
signed last March, agreements that we 
hope will be considered and approved 
promptly by the Senate. 
Our good relations with Switzerland 
have been bolstered in recent months 
by visits from the Swiss Minister of 
Defense, Gnaegi, and the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Aubert. Both visits 
went smoothly. While reaffirming their 
own stance of armed neutrality, the 
Swiss have shown support for most as-
pects of U.S. foreign policy. We have 
a modest but important defense re-
lationship with them, including co-
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MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
JULY 25, 19791 
In accordance with the provisions ofPublic 
Law 95-384, I am submitting the following re-
port on progress made during the past sixty 
days toward the conclusion of a negotiated so-
lution of the Cyprus problem. 
In my last report to the Congress on Cyprus, 
dated June 4, I took note of the decision 
reached by President Kyprian~u and Turkish 
Cypriot leader Denktash during their May 
18-19 meetings to resume intercommunal 
negotiations on June 15. These negotiations re-
sumed as scheduled under the chairmanship of 
United Nations Under Secreiary General Perez 
de Cuellar. A number of procedural issues were 
settled in the· course of the first session. Un-
fortunately, however, differences soon arose 
over the interpretation of the ten-point com-
munique agreed upon in Nicosia on May 
18-19, which serves as a broad agenda for the 
talks. The Greek Cypriots took the position that 
the Varosha issue should be di;cussed first in 
accordance with point five of the communique 
which states that "priority will be given to 
reaching agreement on the reset~lement of Va-
rosha." The Turkish Cypriots, on the other 
hand, maintained that point t~o· of the' c'om-
munique, dealing with the overall basis for the 
talks, should be discussed fi~st. · · 
When it became clear that these differences 
of approach could not easily b.e 'overcome, 
Under Secretary General Perez de Cuellar de-
cided to recess the negotiations on June 22 and 
to pursue a compromise resolution through in-
formal consultations with the parties. These 
consultations have now been in -progress in 
Nicosia for some four weeks. As of this writ-
production arrangements for some U.S. 
weaponry. ' 
U.S. relations with Austria are es-
sentially troublefree. We respect Aus-
tria's neutrality under the 1955 state 
treaty; at the same time, we admire its 
democratic development and prosper-
ity. We support the Austrian desire to 
make of Vienna a third U.N. city, and 
we are grateful for Austrian hospitality 
in connection with the summit confer-
ence held there in June. 
U.S. relations with nonaligned Yu-
goslavia have continued to improve 
across the board, as both sides haye 
demonstrated a conscious effort to re-
solve differences and to build a climate 
of trust for the present and the future. 
President Tito's state visit to Wash-
ington in March 1978 provided the op-
portunity for in-depth discussions. This 
ing, no firm date has been set for reconvening 
the talks, although· there have been indications 
of greater flexibility ~nd the· elements of a so-
lution are beginning· io emerge. Our assessment 
is that given sufficient determination on' the 
part of all concerned a practical way ~an be 
found otit of these current difficulties that will 
permit the negotiators to return to the table 
within a short time. I assure you that this Ad-
ministration will continue to work closely with 
the United Nations, the Cypriot parties and our 
allies both to overcome the present, hopefully 
temporary, difficulties and to help ensure ulti-
mate success _in the negotiations. 
The Turkish Cypriot side has not yet given 
final endorsement to the procedures worked out 
in Nicosia on May 18-19 concerning the for-
mation of a jo_int committee to trace and ac-
count for missing persons in Cyprus. _With the 
assistance of expert organizations such as the 
International Red Cross, the proposed joint 
committee should b.e in a position to resolve 
this long-standing humanitarian problem. 
I enclose with this report a copy of 
Secretary-General Waldheim's comprehensive 
report on May 31 to the United Nations Secu-
rity Council on the United Nations operation in 
Cyprus. · 
Sincerely, 
JIMMY CARTER 0 
1 Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives, and Frank Church, chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
of July 30, 1979). 
dialogue has continued through a dozen 
or so letters between the two Presidents 
and through frequent consultations. 
Other Yugoslav visitors have included 
Assembly President Markovic and De-
fense Secretary Ljubicic. From our 
side, several Cabinet-level officials 
have visited Yugoslavia or are planning 
to this year. 
In the economic area, we have made 
significant efforts to increase trade and 
to improve further the climate for U.S. 
business in Yugoslavia .. The United 
States is Yugoslavia's fourth largest 
trade partner and is first in the value of 
joint ventures, but we are convinced 
that both trade and investment can be 
increased further. 
In scientific affairs, the two sides re-
cently reviewed the achievements of 
the joint science and technology pro-
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gram over the past 5 years, but the fu-
ture of this highly successful program 
is clouded by the prospect that the 
United States may be forced to cut its 
contribution to about one-third of the 
level of the past 5 years. 
On the cultural side, Joan Mondale 
recently opened a major exhibit of 
American arts in Belgrade. Mrs. Mon-
dale also visited the earthquake-
stricken Republic of Montenegro. Fol-
lowing the severe earthquake, April 15, 
the United States mobilized a major 
disaster relief effort which resulted in 
the prompt delivery of nearly $1.3 mil-
lion worth of relief supplies. We are 
currently in the process of working out 
a program of longer term rehabilitation 
and reconstruction assistance. 
All of this activity is in support of a 
policy which has remained consistent 
through every Administration since 
1948: We support Yugoslavia's inde-
pendence, territorial integrity, and 
unity. But, in addition, we are trying to 
move our relations toward broader in-
terchange, mutual understanding, and 
confidence. 
Evolution of East-West Relations 
Much that the United States pursues 
with the nations of Western Europe, 
Canada, and Yugoslavia reflects our 
shared interest in fostering improved 
East-West relations. The Carter Ad-
ministration has devoted substantial 
high-level attention to this area of con-
cern. Since I understand that you will 
be holding separate hearings on U.S. 
relations with the Soviet Union and 
SALT, I will focus on U.S. policy to-
ward Eastern Europe. 
We are grateful to this subcommittee 
for your initiative in convening hear-
ings last year on recent developments 
and trends in Eastern Europe. The 
statement which then Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Luers presented to you, Sep-
tember 7, remains valid as a com-
prehensive account of U.S. policy and 
objectives toward the region. As Mr. 
Luers indicated then, we are mindful of 
the increased diversity in Eastern 
Europe and, at the same time, of the 
importance of contributing to the secu-
rity of all of Europe in pursuing our 
policies. Thus, we intend neither to 
leave our relations with Eastern Europe 
hostage to relations with the Soviet 
Union nor to conduct a policy that is 
reckless and destabilizing. 
In Eastern Europe, we have con-
tinued to make progress toward more 
normal relations with individual coun-
tries. We have expanded and inten-
sified human contacts, trade, cultural 
and scientific exchanges, and discus-
sions of political and security issues. 
Our approach is designed to recog-
nize and support the sovereignty and 
individuality of each Eastern European 
nation in its domestic and foreign af-
fairs. 
During the past 18 months, our rela-
tions with Romania, Poland, and 
Hungary have been particularly active 
and fruitful. For example, with Ro-
mania, which pursues an independent 
foreign policy in many respects, we 
have conducted a useful dialogue on a 
broad range of international political 
and economic issues. These discussions 
were given special impetus during 
President Ceausescu' s visit here in 
April 1978 and by subsequent visits to 
Romania by Secretaries Blumenthal 
[Treasury] and Kreps [Commerce]. 
With Poland, official and nongov-
ernmental exchanges continue to de-
velop, and the level of our two-way 
trade rose to over $1 billion last year. 
Earlier this week, Polish Foreign 
Minister Emil Wojtaszek visited 
Washington for an extensive review of 
bilateral and international issues. And, 
U.S.-Hungarian relations continued to 
improve, as demonstrated by successful 
conclusion last year of a bilateral trade 
agreement extending most favored na-
tion tariff treatment to the exports of 
both countries. 
With Czechoslovakia our first pri-
ority continues to be a satisfactory res-
olution of the nationalization claims of 
U.S. citizens. Following consultations 
with the Congress, we hope to be able 
to initiate new talks on this longstand-
ing problem in the coming months. 
Our relations with Bulgaria have 
continued to show gradual improve-
ment, although progress in family 
reunification has been slower than we 
had hoped. 
The United States is continuing to 
try to develop improved relations with 
the German Democratic Republic. 
We recently completed negotiation of a 
consular convention with the G.D.R. in 
which, to our satisfaction and that of 
the F.R.G., we successfully defended 
the position that there is a single Ger-
man nationality. When the convention 
has been signed, the way will be open 
for some modest development of our 
relations with the G.D.R. For example, 
the G. D. R. will then be allowed to 
open two trade offices in New York. 
We will continue to stress claims, our 
desire for more action on divided fam-
ily cases, and the need for a general 
improvement in their emigration 
record. 
Of course, we continue to have cer-
tain fundamental differences with the 
governments of the Eastern European 
countries. We are concerned about the 
lack of democratic institutions, about 
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uneven observance of human rights, 
and issues such as divided families and 
denial of freedom of movement which 
directly affect many American citizens. 
But, it is also clear that the expansion 
of U.S. relations with these countries 
has enhanced our ability to talk cim-
didly with their governments about 
these and other issues. 
During the past months, for exam-
ple, we have had constructive consul-
tations with Eastern European govern-
ments concerning further progress in 
implementing all aspects of the Hel-
sinki Final Act, and we expect to con-
tinue to use these bilateral exchanges 
as we approach the Madrid Review 
Conference for the Conference on Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE). 
Indeed, continuing attention to the 
CSCE process has been an integral part 
of U.S. policy in the area of East-West 
relations. Our objective in the CSCE is 
to achieve full implementation of the 
Helsinki Final Act and thereby reduce 
international tensions, improve observ-
ance of human rights, and solve some 
of the human problems caused by the 
political differences among European 
states. Progress has been slow, and 
there have been many setbacks. Yet, 
we have seen some effort by all sig-
natories to implement the Final Act and 
thus believe that sustained attention to 
carrying out the commitments undertak-
en in Helsinki will have a positive 
effect. 
The first meeting for review of im-
plementation, held in Belgrade, ended 
in March 1978. That meeting achieved 
our major aim of providing a full and 
complete review of the follow-through 
of the Helsinki accords. The time since 
the Belgrade meeting has been devoted 
to a series of experts meetings; to pre-
pare a scientific forum; to discuss 
peaceful settlement of disputes; and to 
consider economic, cultural, and sci-
entific cooperation in the Mediterra-
nean. 
In addition the United States, its al-
lies, and the other participating states 
in the CSCE have now turned their at-
tention fully to the review meeting to 
be held in Madrid in 1980. The United 
States has held bilateral consultations, 
using the Final Act as a framework, 
with Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, the 
German Democratic Republic, Hun-
gary, Poland, Romania, Spain, and 
Switzerland. Consultations were re-
cently held with Yugoslavia and Swe-
den. We have also had the first of a 
long series of discussions on the Ma-
drid meeting in NATO. We anticipate 
that these consultations will continue 
throughout the period leading to 
Madrid. 
~ • -_ Jfl 
* November 1979 
At that meeting, the United States 
favors seeking a review of implemen-
tation of the Final Act and considera-
tion of a limited number of new pro-
posals. Any new proposals should be 
balanced to reflect the major concerns 
of the Final Act. We should not favor, 
for example, adopting new proposals in 
the military area without including new 
humanitarian measures. 
Conclusion 
Concern with security and the im-
portance of the individual brings me 
full circle in this tour d'horizon of 
U.S.-European relations. Several 
points of particular import emerge from 
this summary of Western military se-
curity, Western economic well-being, 
bilateral relations with individual na-
tions, and the evolution of East-West 
relations. 
First, U.S. objectives in Europe are 
clear. We have a firm sense of overall 
direction and priority. We consider 
U.S. relations with Europe the cor-
nerstone of American foreign policy. 
Through pursuit of shared aspirations 
with the nations of Western Europe and 
Canada, we seek to assure strong de-
fense and fullest possible economic and 
political opportunity for our citizens. 
Through promotion of detente with the 
countries of Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union, we try to curtail danger-
ous competition and expand construc-
tive cooperation. 
Second, active and sustained pursuit 
of these goals has helped serve impor-
tant U.S. interests. Relations with the 
nations of Western Europe and Canada 
are sound. Although much of the rest 
of the world is torn by turmoil, there is 
institutional stability and a sense of 
communal progress in the west. Since I 
last met with you for a review of 
U.S.-European relations, there have 
been elections in lO European coun-
tries. Transitions have been orderly, 
both in terms of the changing of guard 
from one government to the next and in 
terms of continuing American coopera-
tion with the new heads of government. 
For the first time in its history, all 
members of NATO are democracies. 
We have resisted retrenchment into na-
tional reaction to challenges that trans-
cend borders. We have, instead, 
reached out to work together on mutual 
problems for mutual benefit. It is for 
that reason that NATO is strong and 
growing stronger and that we have re-
sisted the worst protectionist pressures 
in a generation in order to try together 
to shape a healthier world economy. At 
the same time, we have achieved con-
tinuing success in building more nor-
mal relations with Eastern Europe-
relations that reflect the diversity of the 
area, our interest in security, and our 
concerns with fundamental human 
rights. 
Third, we recognize that, despite 
some achievements to date, much re-
mains to be done. The problems before 
us-most notably those in the area of 
economics and energy and those in the 
sphere of East- West relations-are 
complex. Bilateral frictions persist. 
Uncertainties exist within some Euro-
pean nations, especially those in the 
Mediterranean area. We are, however, 
determined to persist in the pursuit of 
vital U.S. objectives. And, we feel 
confident that we can succeed. As 
Secretary Vance stated in his address 
before the Royal Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs in London on December 
9, 1978: 
We have passed through a particularly dif-
ficult period during the 1970's. But we have 
navigated these turbulent waters. Although the 
course ahead remains demanding, the progress 
we have made should give us great confidence 
in our future. 0 
1 The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 




On September 5, 1979, representa-
tives of the Government of the United 
States of America on the one part, and 
the Government of Denmark and the 
Home Government of the Faroe Islands 
on the other part, signed a new agree-
ment relating to fishing activities of the 
Faroe Islands off the coasts of the 
United States. 
The agreement sets out the arrange-
ments between the countries which will 
govern fishing by Faroese vessels 
within the fishery conservation zone of 
the United States. The agreement will 
come into force after the completion of 
internal procedures by the govern-
ments. 0 
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MIDDLE EAST: Vision of Peace 
by Zbigniew Brzezinski 
.Ad~ress before the World Jewish 
Congress in New York City on Sep-
tember 17, 1979. Mr. Brzezinski is As-
sistant to the Pres!dent for National 
Security Affairs. 1 · . 
We meet at an historic moment. One 
year ago tonight, President Carter, 
Prime Minister Begin, and President 
Sadat signed the Camp David accords. 
The electrifying meeting in the White 
House East Room culminated 13 days 
of the most intensive diplomatic nego-
tiation in history. It marked the first 
moment, in 30 years of efforts, when 
people could truly say: Yes, peace i~ 
possible in the Middle East. · 
President Carter spoke that night for 
all Americans: · 
We are privileged to witness tonight a sig-
nificant achievement in the cause of peace, an 
achievement none thought possible a year ago, 
or even a month ago, an achievement that re-
flects the courage and wisdom of these two 
leaders. 
And I may say, as one privileged to 
have participated at Camp David, that 
none of this would have been possible 
without the courage and wisdom of that 
begun. Last March 26, for the first 
time iri its history, Israel at last found 
itself at peace-a real peace-with one 
of its neighbors. I can only tell you that 
nothing I have ever experienced can 
compare with that moment at the air-
port in Cairo, when President Carter 
lifted the phone to tell Prime Minister 
Begin that peace was finally within 
grasp. It_ was an extraordinary triumph 
of statesmanship, of personal courage, 
of vision-a triumph shared by Presi-
dent Carter, Prime Minister Begin, and 
President Sadat. 
I felt deep pride in all three men for 
what they alone, in a long line of lead-
ers of these three nations, had accom-
plished for the people of Israel, for the 
people of Egypt, and-I believe-
ultimately for all the peoples of the 
Middle East. "No more war, no more 
bloodshed, no more bereave-
ment. "-the words of Prime Minister 
Begin at the treaty signing-"Peace 
unto you-shalom, salaam forever." 
Negotiations on 
Palestinian Autonomy 
Yet even as we rejoiced, all of us, at 
the new state of peace between Israel 
and Egypt, we knew that the task was 
The time has come, too, for all Palestinians to accept fully, and in 
good faith, U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 and Israel's right to exist; 
the time is fast approaching when the Palestinians should enter the 
autonomy negotiations. . . . 
third great leader-the President of the 
United States, Jimmy Carter. 
We are also here tonight because we 
share a common commitment to the 
future of Israel, to its security, and a 
common commitment to peace. The 
United States and Israel share some-
thing that today is particularly impor-
tant-a belief that human society must 
be able to devise ways for the peaceful 
resolution of disputes, whether within 
each country, or between them and 
thejr· neighbors. The peoples of both 
countries are passionately committed to 
peace___:and there is no higher· calling 
in either country than that of 
peacemaker. 
The United States today is at peace; 
Israel has enjoyed but few moments _of 
peace. Yet tangible prog~e~s has 
not done; that it was important to move 
ahead with the other half of the Camp 
David agreements-a peaceful solution 
for the West Bank and Gaza. 
.This task is more difficult than the 
first: the que-stions it raises are, at first 
glance, more opaque; the stakes for 
Israel, its neighbors, and for a lasting 
peace throughout the region clearly are 
far higher. 
In this process, all the parties are 
challenged to exercise the same wis-
dom and. foresight that brought the 
dramatic visit of President Sadat to 
Jerusalem and led to the Camp David 
accords, with all their hopes for the 
future. The time has come, too, for all 
Palestinians to· accept fully, and in 
good faith, U.N. Resolutions 242 and 
338 and Israel's right to exist; the time 
is fast approaching when the Palestin-
ians should enter the autonomy negoti-
ations to help determine their own 
future-though their unwillingness to 
enter must not be permitted to delay the 
Israeli-Egyptian-U.S. talks. 
And we all must seek to avoid any 
impediments to peace that lie in the 
way: whether by continued building of 
settlements on the West Bank, which 
plays so directly into the hands of those 
who· argue that Israel does not genu-
inely desire an agreement; or by the use 
of Lebanon for terrorist attacks on Is-
rael; or by the retaliatory devastation of 
that helpless country. 
Israel, meanwhile, has a right to ar-
rangements that will guarantee its se-
curity. Yet, in securing this right, in 
demanding full recognition as a Middle 
East state, Israel also bears a responsi-
bility to reach out to the Palestinians in 
new and creative ways. The Israeli na-
tion, which has suffered so much and 
worked so hard to gain acceptance in 
the region, must also be prepared to 
accept legitimate Palestinian rights and 
to interpret the Camp David accords on 
the West Bank and Gaza both gener-
ously and with wise attention to the 
needs of an enduring peace with the 
Palestinian people; all, of course, with 
due regard for Israel's genuine security 
needs. 
Representatives of the three Camp 
David countries-Minister Burg, Prime 
Minister Khalil, and Ambassador 
Strauss-are striving to make the 
negotiations on autonomy succeed. 
Each carries the mandate of his gov-
ernment to make them succeed, and 
each carries with him the hopes and 
prayers of his people. 
Bob Strauss has just returned from 
the Middle East to report that those 
talks are progressing on track and 
ahead of schedule. They are full of 
promise, and full of the basic good will 
and mutual trust that are vital to carry-
ing on the great work of peace. At the 
same time, the Treaty of Peace between 
Israel and Egypt is no longer just 
words. It is turning into facts-facts 
that should prove to all the joint com-
mitment of these countries to both the 
letter and spirit of the Camp David ac-
cords, in their entirety. 
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Begin 
and President Sadat are building upon 
their own unique friendship: leaders of 
once bitter enemies who know that to 
build peace is to build for the future of 
-~ 
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